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COMMENT
JOHNSON V. CALIFORNIA AND THE INITIAL
ASSESSMENT OF BA TSON CLAIMS
Deana Kim El-Mallawany*
INTRODUCTION
Peremptory challenges-the procedural device for removing eligible
venirepersons from the petit jury without having to provide a reason-result
in the exclusion of jurors on the basis of race, gender, and other group
identifications.' On one hand, this result is not surprising, as anyone
exposed to a dose of pop psychology might assume that people are more
likely to favor the position of others with the same group affiliation. 2 On
the other hand, this result is appalling, considering that the U.S. Supreme
Court has unequivocally condemned the practice of status-based
peremptory strikes, which reduces minority participation in the democratic
institution of jury service.3 But in either case, status-based peremptory
strikes invite public skepticism about the race neutrality and impartiality of
jury proceedings, even if group membership ultimately has no effect on the
jury's decision.4
Although the Supreme Court recognized long ago the equal protection
rights that are violated when attorneys exercise peremptory challenges on
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Fordham University School of Law. Many thanks to Professor
Daniel Richman for his guidance.
1. See Gregory E. Mize, A Legal Discrimination: Juries Aren't Supposed to be Picked
on the Basis of Race and Sex, But It Happens All the Time, Wash. Post, Oct. 8, 2000, at B8
(cited in Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El I1), 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2341 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring)).
2. See Unreasonable Doubt, New Republic, Oct. 23, 1995, at 8 (discussing the O.J.
Simpson acquittal and stating that "[l]ike bartering legislators, representative jurors [are]
expected to vote their group loyalties"). Particularly in racially or otherwise charged cases,
peremptory challenges are plainly based on such expectations. See, e.g., United States v.
Nelson, 277 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2002) (vacating the conviction of a black defendant for the
murder of an Orthodox Jew during a time of hostility between the African-American and
Jewish communities because the district court sua sponte removed and replaced jurors to
include members of the defendant's and victim's races).
3. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
4. Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure? A Contemporary Review
of Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 707, 764, 764-65 (1993) (quoting
the Chair of The Jury Project of New York's remark that '[a]mong minorities, a perception
that they are not being called to serve in sufficient numbers exacerbates existing suspicions
about whether the justice system works for minorities or is stacked against them').
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the basis of group membership, the Court has struggled to give meaningful
protection to these rights. 5 In Batson v. Kentucky, 6 the Court developed a
three-part framework 7 for determining the constitutionality of peremptory
challenges, but it has proven largely ineffective. 8 The persistence of status-
based peremptory challenges despite Batson invited Justice Stephen G.
Breyer to echo Justice Thurgood Marshall's original call for the abolition of
peremptory challenges in two recent concurring opinions. 9 Many scholars
and judges also urge for the elimination of peremptory strikes or propose
alternative jury selection procedures.' 0 Indeed, abolition appears to be the
5. See Miller-El 11, 125 S. Ct. at 2324 (admitting that although the Court has
recognized that discrimination in jury selection offends the Equal Protection Clause, "[t]he
rub has been the practical difficulty of ferreting out discrimination in selections discretionary
by nature").
6. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 49-51 for a description of the three-part
framework.
8. See infra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of some criticisms of Batson.
9. See Rice v. Collins, 126 S. Ct. 969, 976-77 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring); Miller-El
II, 125 S. Ct. at 2340-44 (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing the problems with Batson, the
persistence of the discriminatory use of peremptory strikes despite Batson, the anomaly that
peremptory strikes have become in the judicial system, and the growing support for
abolition). In Rice, Justice David H. Souter joined the concurrence and the movement for
abolition.
10. See, e.g., Edwards S. Adams & Christian J. Lane, Constructing a Jury that is Both
Impartial and Representative: Utilizing Cumulative Voting in Jury Selection, 73 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 703 (1998) (proposing a method of jury selection that dispenses with peremptory
challenges and that instead is based on a cumulative voting model); Raymond J. Broderick,
Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 369 (1992); Arthur
L. Burnett, Sr., Abolish Peremptory Challenges: Reforming Juries to Promote Impartiality,
Crim. Just., Fall 2005, at 26 (proposing that peremptory challenges should be abolished
completely); Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory
Challenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 808, 811
(1989) (advocating the elimination of only prosecutorial peremptory challenges); Nancy S.
Marder, Justice Stevens, the Peremptory Challenge, and the Jury, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1683
(2006) (urging the Supreme Court to eliminate the peremptory and expanding the for-cause
challenge); Toni M. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers? Rethinking Sixth Amendment
Doctrine, Images, and Procedures, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 501 (1986) (arguing for the elimination
of the prosecutor's right to peremptory challenges); Kenneth B. Nunn, Rights Held Hostage:
Race, Ideology and the Peremptory Challenge, 28 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 63, 69-70 (1993)
(arguing that "the peremptory challenge of Black venirepersons should be prohibited
whenever there is a substantial likelihood that racial issues would impact the trial"); Charles
J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses of
Peremptory Challenges, 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1099, 1100 (1994) (recommending new
restrictions on the use of peremptory challenges); Andrew G. Gordon, Note, Beyond Batson
v. Kentucky: A Proposed Ethical Rule Prohibiting Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection,
62 Fordham L. Rev. 685 (1993) (proposing ethical rules to substantiate Batson); Brent J.
Gurney, Note, The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 227 (1986). But see Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its
Wonderful Power, " 27 Stan. L. Rev. 545 (1975) (arguing the virtues of peremptory strikes);
Barbara L. Horwitz, Comment, The Extinction of the Peremptory Challenge: What Will the
Jury System Lose by Its Demise?, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1391 (1993) (opposing the abolition of
peremptory challenges). In practice, at least one federal judge has independently barred the
use of peremptory challenges in her courtroom. See Minetos v. City Univ. of N.Y., 925 F.
Supp. 177, 183, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that peremptory challenges are "an
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best solution for eradicating discrimination from the selection of the petit
jury. 11
Nevertheless, in 2005, the Court issued two Batson decisions, 12
confirming that Batson and the peremptory challenge are still valid features
of the American jury trial. If, or until, a majority of the Court considers
abolishing peremptory strikes, Batson challenges are the only protection
against status-based exclusions of jurors. This reality urges a new look at
the Court's most recent interpretations of the Batson framework.
This Comment examines the Court's decision last year in Johnson v.
California in light of the Court's previous peremptory challenge cases to
assess whether the Court is advancing both the practical implementation
and the theory of Batson in the right direction. This Comment ultimately
argues that, by mandating a low prima facie threshold at the first step of
Batson, the Johnson Court undermined the only workable step in the
process of determining whether peremptory strikes are purposefully
discriminatory. By instead permitting trial courts to develop stricter prima
facie requirements, the Court would have enabled trial judges to implement
the prima facie standard as a tool to sort Batson challenges, compelled trial
judges to focus their determinations on more reliable evidence, and
substantiated the prima facie case with a rebuttable presumption of
discrimination. Although allowing trial courts to raise the prima facie
threshold certainly would not solve all of the problems with Batson and is
perhaps an unconventional position, this approach would have been a step
toward more effective regulation of peremptory challenges.
Part I of this Comment provides background on the peremptory
challenge, its inherent conflict with equal protection, and the Supreme
Court cases that recognized the rights at stake when peremptory challenges
are exercised on the basis of group bias. Part I then examines Batson's
three-step analysis for ferreting out the discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges and the cases interpreting each of the three steps in the Batson
framework. Part II focuses on Johnson v. California, contrasting the
Supreme Court's approach with the forgone alternative. Part II identifies
the arguments in favor of and against the Court's imposition of a low prima
facie standard as well as arguments in favor of and against the discretion of
trial courts to raise the prima facie standard. Finally, Part III argues that the
strongest arguments are in favor of allowing trial courts to implement
higher prima facie standards.
unnecessary waste of time and an obvious corruption of the judicial process," as well as a
"per se violat[ion of] equal protection").
11. Abolition of peremptory challenges alone, however, would not result in more
representative juries because defects in other parts of the jury selection process contribute to
the problem of underrepresentation of minorities on juries. See infra note 24.
12. The Court decided Miller-El I and Johnson v. California on the same day, June 13,
2005. Each case is discussed infra Part I.C. 1. and I.C.3.
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I. THE HISTORY AND CURRENT STATE OF BATSON AND EQUAL
PROTECTION IN JURY SELECTION
A. The Peremptory Challenge. A Two-Faced Symbol of Fairness and
Injustice in Jury Trials
The peremptory challenge is a time-honored feature of the jury trial. 13 In
the United States, federal and state courts have long recognized the right of
parties to exercise peremptory challenges. 14 Using a statutorily specified
number of peremptory challenges, parties may exclude qualified
prospective jurors from the petit jury without assigning any reason for the
challenge. 15
From the perspective of the striking party, the peremptory challenge is an
instrument of fairness, enabling parties to secure fair trials by removing
jurors who appear biased in favor of the opposing side or inclined to decide
the case on some basis other than the evidence presented at trial. 16 Trial
lawyers frequently rely on peremptory strikes when the trial judge denies
their challenges for cause, 17 which require a "narrowly specified, provable
13. The earliest use of peremptory challenges dates back to the selection of the first
juries in the Roman Empire. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 119-20 (1986) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) (citing W. Forsyth, History of Trial by Jury 175 (1852)). The United States
adopted the peremptory challenge from English common law, codified the peremptory
challenge by the defendant in federal criminal trials in 1790, and extended its exercise to
prosecutors in 1865. Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment
as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 9-
12 (1990) (describing the origin and purpose of the peremptory challenge). "By 1870, most,
if not all, states had enacted statutes conferring on the prosecution a substantial number of
peremptory challenges." Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 216 (1965).
14. Jeffrey S. Brand, The Supreme Court, Equal Protection and Jury Selection:
Denying that Race Still Matters, 1994 Wis. L. Rev. 511, 564-65.
15. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220 ("The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is
one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the
court's control."); see also Black's Law Dictionary 223 (7th ed. 1999) (defining the
peremptory challenge as one "that need not be supported by any reason, although a party
may not use such a challenge in a way that discriminates against a protected minority").
16. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 91 (noting that peremptory challenges "traditionally have
been viewed as one means of assuring the selection of a qualified and unbiased jury");
Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (noting that "[t]he function of the challenge is not only to eliminate
extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors before whom
they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not
otherwise").
17. See Leonard Post, Striking Peremptories Gets a Cool Reception, Nat'l L.J., June 20,
2005, at 6 (reporting statements by both defense lawyers and prosecutors that peremptory
strikes are necessary to remove jurors that the trial judge should have excused for cause and
should not be abolished for that reason). If a defendant peremptorily strikes a juror to
correct a judge's erroneous ruling on a challenge for cause, however, the defendant may not
seek review of the erroneous ruling on appeal because he has not, in effect, been harmed
despite his loss of a peremptory strike. See United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304
(2000) (holding that the defendant's rights secured by the rule entitling defendants to
peremptory strikes and the defendant's due process rights were not violated when he
exercised a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror after the district court
erroneously refused to dismiss the juror for cause). For a discussion of the implications of
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and legally cognizable basis" for the juror's bias. 18  Recognizing the
importance of the peremptory challenge in selecting an unbiased jury, the
Supreme Court has noted that, although the right to peremptory challenges
is not guaranteed by the Constitution, 19 it is "'one of the most important of
the rights secured to the accused.' 20
From another perspective, however, the peremptory challenge is not an
instrument of fairness, but rather of injustice. Because the peremptory
challenge requires no explanation for its exercise, trial lawyers may remove
prospective jurors based on "an often seriously mistaken or ill-intended
sociological judgment about the effect of a juror's race, nationality or
gender [on the juror's attitude] towards a particular party."' 21  These
judgments tend to rely on traditional stereotypes or modem demographic
surveys that characterize the attitudes of individuals according to race,
ethnicity, gender, occupation, socioeconomic status, and age.22 Status-
based exclusion of jurors, which has come to be regarded as an "inherent
aspect of the peremptory challenge system, '23 impedes the participation of
minorities injury service and often nullifies minority defendants' rights to a
jury of their peers. 24 The ongoing project of the Supreme Court has been to
using peremptory challenges to correct perceived error in a judge's ruling on challenges for
cause, see generally William G. Childs, The Intersection of Peremptory Challenges,
Challenges for Cause, and Harmless Error, 27 Am. J. Crim. L. 49 (1999).
18. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220.
19. Batson, 476 U.S. at 91. The right to exercise peremptory challenges is provided by
federal and state statutes, which specify the number of peremptories available to each party.
20. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (quoting Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894)).
Some commentators agree about the importance of the right to peremptory strikes. See, e.g.,
Babcock, supra note 10, at 555 (arguing that the "impartiality-promoting role of the
peremptory challenge makes it central to the jury trial right"); William F. Fahey, Peremptory
Challenges: A Crucial Tool for Trial Lawyers, Crim. Just., Spring 1997, at 24, 30
(concluding that the trend in the law to limit peremptory challenges is causing the justice
system to suffer).
21. Leonard L. Cavise, The Batson Doctrine: The Supreme Court's Utter Failure to
Meet the Challenge of Discrimination in Jury Selection, 1999 Wis. L. Rev. 501, 502-03. But
see Fahey, supra note 20, at 27 ("Every experienced trial attorney will tell you that you can
and must rely on known group memberships and identifications in selecting a winning jury.
. . . Not to take group membership into account would be foolhardy and, perhaps,
malpractice").
22. Brian J. Serr & Mark Maney, Racism, Peremptory Challenges, and the Democratic
Jury: The Jurisprudence of a Delicate Balance, 79 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1, 8 (1988);
see also Carol A. Chase & Colleen P. Graffy, A Challenge for Cause Against Peremptory
Challenges in Criminal Proceedings, 19 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 507, 508 (1997)
("[Pleremptory challenges, which are often based on ethnic, religious, cultural, or
socioeconomic factors, reflect the preiudices and biases of the attorneys, the parties, and
often the costly jury consultants retained to assist in the jury selection process.").
23. Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and
Peremptory Challenges, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 447, 447 (1996); see also Serr & Maney,
supra note 22, at 8 ("The very nature of the peremptory challenge is at odds with a jury of
peers.")
24. Serr & Maney, supra note 22, at 9. For an empirical study of the
underrepresentation of minorities on juries, see Hiroshi Fukurai et al., Race and the Jury:
Racial Disenfranchisement and the Search for Justice (1994). The peremptory challenge is
not alone responsible for the underrepresentation of minorities in juries. All stages of jury
3337
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eliminate peremptory strikes based on group status without sacrificing the
historic privilege of parties to remove jurors at their discretion.
B. The Birth and Evolution of the Equal Protection Right
The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutional concerns that arise
with discriminatory jury selection practices in 1879. In Strauder v. West
Virginia,25 the Court announced the principle that a state denies a black
defendant equal protection when it puts him on trial before a jury from
which members of his race have been purposefully excluded. 26
In 1965,27 a young black defendant in Alabama invoked the Strauder
principle to challenge his rape conviction and death sentence rendered by an
all-white jury from which the prosecutor had excluded the only six black
veniremen using peremptory strikes. 28 In this case, Swain v. Alabama,29 the
Court recognized that a black defendant is denied equal protection when the
prosecutor exercises peremptory strikes intentionally to exclude members
selection-venue choice, source list development, qualified list development, and jury panel
selection-contribute to the disproportionate exclusion of minorities. King, supra note 4, at
712. See id. at 711-19, for a brief discussion of jury selection procedures and the reasons
why minorities are still underrepresented. To address the persistent problem of
underrepresentation of minorities in jury pools, Judge Nancy Gertner recently ordered a
departure from her district's venire selection plan to ensure the inclusion of African-
Americans in the jury pool for the capital trial of two black defendants. United States v.
Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D. Mass. 2005) (ordering repeated attempts to contact
individuals in selected ZIP codes where a high percentage of African-Americans reside).
The First Circuit entered a writ of mandamus blocking the order. In re United States, 426
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005). Whereas the peremptory challenge cases concern the defendant's
equal protection right secured by the Fourteenth Amendment, the venire selection cases
concern the Sixth Amendment, which requires juries to be selected from a jury pool
representing a fair cross section of the community under Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357
(1979).
25. 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (holding that West Virginia's law explicitly barring African-
Americans from serving on juries violated black defendants' rights to equal protection of the
laws).
26. The same day, however, the Court held that while a black defendant is entitled to a
jury selected without discrimination against members of his race, he is not entitled to a jury
that contains members of his race. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879). Further
undermining the impact of Strauder, the Court held that if a state's facially discriminatory
jury service statute was passed prior to the post-Civil War Amendments, then the
constitutional amendments and the Civil Rights Act of 1875 render the statute inoperative,
and there can be no violation of a black defendant's equal protection rights, even if no single
African-American has ever served on a jury in the state. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370
(1880).
27. In the period between 1880 and 1965, the Court decided several cases on the
exclusion of African-Americans from grand and petit jury venires. See Cassell v. Texas, 339
U.S. 282 (1950); Atkins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587
(1935); Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278 (1909). For an insightful discussion of the Court's
venire selection cases and how they shaped the Court's framework for dealing with race
discrimination in the peremptory challenge cases, see Brand, supra note 14, at 530-72.
28. See Pamela S. Karlan, Batson v. Kentucky: The Constitutional Challenges of
Peremptory Challenges, in Criminal Procedure Stories 381, 382 (Carol S. Steiker, ed.,
2006).
29. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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of the defendant's race from the petit jury.30 Ultimately, however, the
Court concluded that Robert Swain failed to establish a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination, which required sufficient detail about the
prosecutor's longstanding and "systematic use" of peremptory strikes based
on the jurors' race. 31 In the battle between the prosecutor's statutory right
to exercise peremptory strikes and the defendant's equal protection right to
be tried before a jury selected free from racial discrimination, the sanctity of
the peremptory challenge prevailed,32 and Swain's conviction was upheld.
In Batson v. Kentucky,33 the tables turned, and the peremptory challenge
had to give way to the constitutional claim of equal protection. 34 The Court
recognized that the State's use of peremptory strikes to exclude members of
the defendant's race not only denied Batson equal protection, but also
unconstitutionally discriminated against the four excluded black jurors35
30. Id. at 203-04 ("[A] State's purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes on account of
race of participation as jurors in the administration of justice violates the Equal Protection
Clause.").
31. Id. at 227 ("[T]he defendant must, to pose the issue, show the prosecutor's
systematic use of peremptory challenges against Negroes over a period of time."). See infra
Part I.C. 1 for a more lengthy discussion of the prima facie requirement in Swain.
32. Swain, 380 U.S. at 221-22 ("To subject the prosecutor's challenge in any particular
case to the demands and traditional standards of the Equal Protection Clause would entail a
radical change in the nature and operation of the challenge. The challenge, pro tanto, would
no longer be peremptory... [a]nd a great many uses of the challenge would be banned.").
33. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
34. Id. at 98-99 (stating that "the peremptory challenge occupies an important position in
our trial procedures," but "[b]y requiring trial courts to be sensitive to the racially
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, our decision enforces the mandate of equal
protection and furthers the ends of justice"). The Court actually granted James Kirkland
Batson certiorari on Sixth Amendment grounds, the only grounds on which Batson
challenged the prosecutor's peremptory strikes, but ultimately identified the violation as one
offending the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 83-84, 89. In Batson, the Court did not
expressly rule on the question of whether the Sixth Amendment prohibited the racially
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Id. at 85 n.4. After Batson, however, the Court
expressly rejected the application of Sixth Amendment principles to peremptory strikes. See
Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990) (holding that the Sixth Amendment's fair cross
section requirement does not prevent the prosecution from exercising its peremptory strikes
to remove cognizable racial groups from the jury). For a historical and analytical account of
the Court's choice of the Equal Protection Clause over the Sixth Amendment as a vehicle for
the jeopardized right, see generally Karlan, supra note 28. For arguments that the Court
should analyze the discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges under the Sixth
Amendment rather than the Equal Protection Clause, see generally Massaro, supra note 10;
Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury Representation, and the
Sixth Amendment, 106 Yale L.J. 93 (1996). Prior to Batson, a number of state courts, most
notably the California Supreme Court, and two federal courts of appeals had espoused the
view that discriminatory use of peremptory strikes violates the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury of the defendant's peers drawn from a fair cross
section of the community. Batson, 476 U.S. at 82 n.l. For further discussion of the
California Supreme Court's pre-Batson decision, see infra notes 66-69 and accompanying
text.
35. Batson, 476 U.S. at 83 (noting that the "prosecutor used his peremptory challenges
to strike all four black persons on the venire, and a jury composed only of white persons was
selected").
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and undermined the public confidence in the fairness of our system of
justice. 36
Through a series of cases since 1986, the Court expanded Batson
dramatically. A critical turning point in the development of Batson was in
1991, when the Court held in Powers v. Ohio37 that a defendant has
standing under the Equal Protection Clause to object to race-based
exclusions of jurors whether or not the defendant and excluded jurors share
the same race. The Court emphasized, as the basis of its decision, the equal
protection right of the excluded juror as paramount over that of the
defendant. 38 The project of Batson thus evolved into the protection of
minorities' rights to participate in the democratic institution of the
American jury.39 Also of analytic significance, by shifting Batson's focus
to the excluded juror, without regard to the race of the defendant, the Court
advanced a standard of colorblindness that affords the same rights to white
and black defendants alike.40
Powers opened the doors of the Batson framework to usher in an
expansive equal protection jurisprudence. 41  The Court next extended
36. See id. at 87. The three harms that discriminatory jury selection inflicts and against
which Batson seeks to protect are as follows: harm to the defendant, harm to the excluded
juror, and harm to the community. For a discussion of these three harms and how
assumptions about racial bias affect their calculus, see generally David Zonana, The Effect of
Assumptions About Racial Bias on the Analysis of Batson's Three Harms and the
Peremptory Challenge, 1994 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 203 (1995).
37. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
38. Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose
Right Is It, Anyway? 92 Colum. L. Rev. 725, 726 (1992) (noting that in Powers, "the rights
of the jurors took center stage"); Michael A. Cressler, Comment, Powers v. Ohio: The
Death Knell for the Peremptory Challenge?, 28 Idaho L. Rev. 349, 350 (1992) ("Powers,
through its third-party standing analysis, marked a significant shift in analytical focus from
the equal protection rights of the criminal defendant to those of the challenged venireman").
Commentators' reactions to Powers have been mixed. Compare Underwood, supra, at 726
(arguing that Powers "identified not merely an alternative basis for the prohibition on jury
discrimination, but in fact a better and sounder basis for the entire existing body of jury
discrimination law"), with Cressler, supra, at 353-54 (arguing that the "Court's shift in
analytical focus . . . create[s] a conflict between the challenged veniremen's equal protection
rights and the parties' right to an impartial jury" that may lead to the abolishment of the
peremptory challenge).
39. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 406-07 (describing the importance of the opportunity to
serve on a jury and participate in the democratic process).
40. See Susan N. Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: Representation-Reinforcement,
Colorblindness, and the Jury, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 1807, 1824 (1993). The Court's
colorblindness principle has been strongly criticized. See id. at 1825 (commenting that "the
Court prefers to ignore defendants' claims that real jurors in the real world are not colorblind
because the Court is inclined to value colorblindness as a categorical imperative"); Nunn,
supra note 10, at 69 (arguing that "colorblindness, as applied by the Supreme Court, is a
form of racial politics that privileges white interests over Black"). But see Underwood, supra
note 38, at 734 (agreeing with the Court that "the Equal Protection Clause should give white
defendants the same right that black defendants have to the possibility of being judged by
jurors of a different race").
41. See Cressler supra note 38, at 350 (stating that, "[w]ith the focus upon the newly-
created equal protection rights of the challenged venireman, the potential for equal
protection claims against the exercise of peremptory challenges becomes incalculable").
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standing to raise Batson challenges to private litigants in civil trials 42 and to
prosecutors challenging the defendant's use of peremptory strikes in
criminal trials. 43 In another line of cases, the Court applied Batson to
protect groups other than African-Americans. 44 It is now unconstitutional
to exercise peremptory challenges not only on the basis of race but also on
the basis of ethnicity45 and gender.46 According to Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, writing for the Court in 1994, Batson would protect any group
otherwise receiving "heightened scrutiny" under the Equal Protection
Clause.47
C. Batson's Framework for Protecting the Equal Protection Right
The previous section discussed the Supreme Court cases that recognized
and expanded the equal protection rights at stake when peremptory strikes
are used to exclude jurors on the basis of group identification. This section
examines the three-step framework that the Batson Court developed to
protect those rights and to determine the constitutionality of peremptory
42. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
43. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992). While on the facts, McCollum prevented
white defendants from using peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors on the basis of
race, Justice Clarence Thomas noted that "it is difficult to see how the result could be
different if the defendants here were black" and using peremptory challenges to exclude
white jurors suspected of harboring racial prejudices. Id at 62 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Courts indeed have upheld the application of McCollum to black defendants exercising race-
based peremptory strikes. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 737 A.2d 1140 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1999); People v. Yarbrough, 589 N.Y.S.2d 891 (App. Div. 1992). Commentators,
however, have argued against this application of McCollum. See, e.g., Deborah Zalesne &
Kinney Zalesne, Saving the Peremptory Challenge: The Case for a Narrow Interpretation of
McCollum, 70 Denv. U. L. Rev. 313 (1993). The majority's application of Batson to the
defendant's use of peremptory strikes led Justice Thomas to remark, "In effect, we have
exalted the right of citizens to sit on juries over the rights of the criminal defendant, even
though it is the defendant, not the jurors, who faces imprisonment or even death."
McCollum, 505 U.S. at 62 (Thomas, J., concurring). For a pre-McCollum article arguing that
the defendant's use of peremptory challenges should not be limited, see Goldwasser, supra
note 10.
44. The question of which groups Batson protects is a question of whether the group is
cognizable for equal protection purposes. Lower courts addressing the cognizability
question have expanded Batson to several specific groups beyond those recognized by the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Green v. Travis, 414 F.3d 288 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that an
aggregate of minorities of different races constitutes a cognizable group); State v. Jordan,
828 P.2d 786 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that for purposes of Batson, a person of Asian
descent is a member of a racially cognizable group); Joseph v. State, 636 So. 2d 777 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that Jewish persons constituted a cognizable class where the
Jewish population of the county was approximately ten percent, and the group had sufficient
cohesiveness of beliefs and experiences to constitute an ethnic group). Some commentators
have urged the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to examine religion-based peremptory
challenges and provide protection in this area. See, e.g., Courtney A. Waggoner, Comment,
Peremptory Challenges and Religion: The Unanswered Prayer for a Supreme Court
Opinion, 36 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 285 (2004).
45. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
46. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
47. Id. at 135.
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strikes.48 The first step requires the objecting party to show that he is a
member of a cognizable group, that the striking party has exercised
peremptory strikes to remove venirepersons of his group, and that the
facts-including the fact that peremptory challenges permit "'those to
discriminate who are of mind to discriminate'-and any other relevant
circumstances raise an inference that the striking party excluded the
venirepersons from the petit jury on account of their group identification.49
Once the objecting party establishes a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination, the burden shifts to the striking party to come forward with
a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory strikes. 50 And finally, if a
race-neutral reason is tendered, the trial court must decide whether the
opponent of the strike has proved purposeful discrimination.51
Initially, the Supreme Court expressly declined to instruct lower courts
on how to implement this three-step process. 52 Over the years, the Court
has provided some guidance,53 reviewing cases concerning each step to
correct what the Court deemed to be a misinterpretation of Batson's
commands in lower courts.54 The rest of this section discusses the Court's
cases that shed light on the prima facie step, the race-neutral reasons step,
and the credibility determination step.
48. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986).
49. Id. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)). For a discussion of
the cases interpreting the first step, see infra Part I.C. 1.
50. See id. at 97. For a discussion of the cases interpreting the second step, see infra
Part I.C.2.
51. Id. at 98. For a discussion of the cases interpreting the third step, see infra Part
I.C.3.
52. Id. at 99 ("We decline.., to formulate particular procedures to be followed upon a
defendant's timely objection to a prosecutor's challenges."); Charles J. Ogletree, Supreme
Court Jury Discrimination Cases and State Court Compliance, Resistance, and Innovation,
in Toward a Usable Past: Liberty Under State Constitutions 339, 349 (Paul Finkelman &
Stephen E. Gottlieb, eds., 1991) ("The Batson Court left the important issue of determining
whether a defendant had established a prima facie case of discrimination and whether the
prosecution had rebutted that prima facie showing to the trial courts.").
53. Justice Byron White predicted in Batson that "[m]uch litigation will be required to
spell out the contours of the Court's equal protection holding today." Batson, 476 U.S. at
102 (White, J., concurring). Although there has been much litigation, the Court's guidance
has consisted mostly of negative holdings rather than prescriptive rules on how to implement
the three-step framework.
54. There are strong elements of a power struggle between the Supreme Court and the
lower courts over who decides how to apply Batson. For example, in Miller-El II, the Court
intervened for the second time with the Fifth Circuit's Batson analysis, granting certiorari
after the Court had remanded the case on the first appeal. 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2339 (2005)
(finding the Fifth Circuit's conclusion on the second appeal "as unsupportable as the
'dismissive and strained interpretation' of [Miller-El's] evidence that we disapproved" on
the first appeal). To persuade the Supreme Court to hear the second appeal, the lawyer
representing Thomas Joe Miller-El appealed to the Court's desire to win the power struggle,
arguing that "by ignoring the Supreme Court majority, the Fifth Circuit's decision
'undermines this court's supervisory authority' and needed the court's attention once again."
Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Rules for Texan on Death Row, N.Y. Times, June 14,
2005, at Al (quoting Seth P. Waxman, former solicitor general handling Miller-El's case).
See infra Part I.C.3 for a discussion of Miller-El.
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1. Lowering the Prima Facie Threshold for Batson Challenges at Step One
In Swain, the Supreme Court imposed an insurmountable evidentiary
burden on defendants to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in
asserting an equal protection claim.55 Swain required the defendant to show
that a prosecutor, "in case after case, whatever the circumstances, . . . is
responsible for the removal of Negroes who have been selected as qualified
jurors ... with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries."'56 This
evidentiary requirement made it "virtually impossible" for black defendants
to establish a prima facie case in asserting their equal protection claim.57
The "primary significance" of Batson58 was the Court's rejection of the
"crippling burden of proof' ' 59 that Swain required of defendants to make a
prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination.60 Following Swain by
more than twenty years, Batson overruled its precedent's evidentiary rule6 1
that left prosecutor's peremptory challenges "largely immune from
constitutional scrutiny." 62 The Batson Court decided that a defendant may
rely "solely on the facts ... in his case" to raise an inference that the
prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on the basis
of race.63
To guide lower courts' assessments of the prima facie case, the Court
gave "merely illustrative" examples of factors to consider, expressing
"confidence that trial judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be
able to decide if the circumstances. . . create[] a prima facie case of
discrimination against black jurors." 64 With such discretion, state courts
independently interpreted the prima facie threshold and developed standards
or factors to measure the evidentiary sufficiency of the prima facie case. 65
55. Ogletree, supra note 52, at 346 ("The requirement in Swain . . . proved
insurmountable in the vast majority of cases."); see also McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113,
1120 (2d Cir. 1984) (referring to the Swain burden of proof as "Mission Impossible");
Karlan, supra note 28, at 383 (describing Swain's prima facie requirement as "an insuperable
evidentiary barrier").
56. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 223 (1965).
57. Colbert, supra note 13, at 94 (noting that "during the next twenty-one years [after
Swain], state and federal courts regularly rejected [defendants' equal protection] claims").
58. Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707, 720 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Williams v.
Woodford, 396 F.3d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 2005) (Rawlinson, J., dissenting) (stating, in
dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc, "the purpose of Batson was to lower the bar for
establishing a prima facie case and to open the door to different methods of proving racial
discrimination in the jury selection process").
59. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92 (1986).
60. Interestingly, the Court was careful to appear to admonish a "number of lower
courts['] ... interpretation of Swain" as requiring "proof of repeated striking of blacks over a
number of cases," rather than the principle announced in Swain itself. See id. at 92.
61. Id. at 100 n.25.
62. Id. at 92-93.
63. Id. at 95.
64. Id. at 97.
65. See Melilli, supra note 23, at 471-72 (describing eight different "methods of
quantifying the results of the peremptory challenges used by the Batson respondent").
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The California Supreme Court, however, preceded the U.S. Supreme
Court in lowering Swain's impossible prima facie hurdle for defendants.
Eight years before Batson, in the landmark case People v. Wheeler,66 the
California Supreme Court turned to its own state constitution to protect the
rights of defendants and excluded minority jurors. 67 Although in later
years, the California courts vacillated as to the correct interpretation of the
prima facie standard set forth in Wheeler,68 the California Supreme Court
resolved that, to establish a prima facie case, the objecting party must show
a strong likelihood-or that it was more likely than not-that the striking
party's peremptory challenges, if not explained, were based on group bias.69
The "more likely than not" standard created a conflict between the
California Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals over
whether this formulation of the prima facie standard violated Batson.70 The
Ninth Circuit denounced California's standard as "'a lower standard of
scrutiny to peremptory strikes than the federal Constitution permits."'' 71
66. 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978) (holding that the use of peremptory challenges to remove
prospective jurors on the sole ground of group bias violates the defendant's right to a trial
drawn from a representative cross section of the community as guaranteed by the state
constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution). It is noteworthy that the
Wheeler court grounded the violation in the Sixth Amendment, rather than the Fourteenth
Amendment. See supra note 34 for a discussion of this distinction.
67. See Ogletree, supra note 52, at 346 (suggesting that "[tihe Supreme Court's
unwillingness to prohibit the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in Swain gave the
states an opportunity to go beyond Swain to find further protections in state constitutional
provisions and other federal constitutional provisions," and that "[t]he California Supreme
Court led the way in People v. Wheeler").
68. Wheeler used both the terms "strong likelihood" and "reasonable inference" in
describing the standard for a prima facie case. 583 P.2d at 764. Inconsistent interpretations
resulted from state appellate courts that understood the two terms to signify different
standards. Compare People v. Bernard 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486, 490 (Ct. App. 1994)
(interpreting "reasonable inference" to be a lower standard than "strong likelihood"), with
People v. Box, 5 P.3d 130, 174 (Cal. 2000) (disapproving of Bernard and stating that
"reasonable inference" and "strong likelihood" are the same standard, as Wheeler implied).
69. See People v. Johnson, 71 P.3d 270, 280 (Cal. 2003).
70. Id. at 277-78 (describing the line of cases that involves the disagreement between the
California Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit over the correct legal standard for a prima
facie case).
71. Cooperwood v. Cambra, 245 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Wade v.
Terhune, 202 F.3d 1190, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that California courts
following the "strong likelihood" standard are not applying the correct legal standard for a
prima facie case under Batson but nonetheless affirming the denial of the writ of habeas
corpus, finding no prima facie case on de novo review)). Under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), federal courts hearing habeas claims must
review a state court's determinations of factual issues-including the fact-specific
determination of whether a defendant has made a prima facie case of a Batson violation-
under a "presumption of correctness," which the applicant of the habeas petition must rebut
by "clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2000). AEDPA also provides
that federal courts may disturb a state court's determinations of law only if they were
"contrary to," or "involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Id. § 2254(d)(1). In Wade, the
Ninth Circuit determined that the state court did not reasonably apply federal law as clearly
established by the Supreme Court in Batson and therefore reviewed the petitioner's habeas
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The California Supreme Court, on the other hand, defended its formulation
as consistent with Batson, particularly considering that the Supreme Court
reserved for state courts "some flexibility in establishing the exact
procedures to follow" in implementing Batson.72
In Johnson v. California, the Supreme Court intervened to settle the issue
of the prima facie threshold set forth in Batson.73 The Court concluded that
"[a]lthough... States do have flexibility in formulating appropriate
procedures to comply with Batson,. .. California's more likely than not
standard is an inappropriate yardstick by which to measure the sufficiency
of a prima facie case."'74 The Court made clear that, at the prima facie
stage, the objecting party does not bear the burden of establishing by a
preponderance of the evidence that the prosecutor's strikes, if unexplained,
were the product of intentional discrimination. 75
According to the Court's interpretation of Batson's first step, the
objecting party must simply produce "evidence sufficient to permit the trial
judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred. '76 In other
words, the evidence need only be sufficient to support a logical
conclusion 77 or suspicion 78 that the prosecutor's exclusion of the juror
might be the consequence of the juror's belonging to a cognizable racial
group.
By mandating a low prima facie threshold, the Supreme Court restricted
the liberty of state courts to experiment with the formulation of the prima
facie standard79 and paved the way for Batson challenges to proceed
through the second and third steps of the framework.
claims de novo because the state court's findings were not entitled to deference. Wade, 202
F.3d at 1192, 1194-95.
72. See Johnson, 71 P.3d at 277.
73. 125 S. Ct. 2410, 2416 (2005).
74. Id. at 2416 (internal quotations omitted).
75. Id. at 2417.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 2416 n.4 (defining inference as a "'conclusion reached by considering
other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them"' (quoting Black's Law
Dictionary, supra note 15, at 781)). At oral arguments, Stephen B. Bedrick, the attorney
representing Johnson, suggested that an analog for the appropriate standard would be
whether the judge thought "in his view a reasonable jury could think it more likely than not"
that the peremptory strikes were based on group bias. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5,
Johnson, 125 S. Ct. 2410 (No. 03-6539) (argued March 30, 2004) [hereinafter "Oral
Argument"]. This case was argued a second time on April 18, 2005. Transcript of Oral
Argument, Johnson, 125 S. Ct. 2410 (No. 04-6964).
78. Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 2419 (noting that the California Supreme Court's
acknowledgment that "it certainly looks suspicious that all three African-American
prospective jurors were removed from the jury" was sufficient to establish a prima facie case
(internal quotations omitted)).
79. See The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Leading Cases, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 218, 226
(2005) (suggesting that in Johnson, "the Court cabined the lower courts' ability and
incentive to take advantage of Batson's flexibility.... The Court thus closed the door on
doctrinal development and announced that Batson's first step is no longer a work in
progress").
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2. Lessening the Burden of Proffering a Race-Neutral Explanation at Step
Two
According to Batson, once the party objecting to a peremptory strike
establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the
proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation.80
An affirmation of good faith or a denial of discriminatory motive in
exercising the strikes is insufficient to rebut the prima facie showing.8 1
Rather, the proponent of the strike "must articulate a neutral explanation
related to the particular case to be tried," 82 stating a "'clear and reasonably
specific' explanation of 'legitimate reasons' for exercising the
challenges." 83
In Hernandez v. New York 84 the Court interpreted the second step to
require only facial neutrality: 8 5 "Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent
in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race
neutral."'86 Based on this interpretation, the Court affirmed the trial court's
finding of no discriminatory intent where a prosecutor struck two Latino
jurors, 87 proffering the explanation that he doubted their ability to defer to
the official translation of anticipated Spanish-language testimony. 88 In
response to the petitioner's contention that strikes based on Spanish-
speaking ability would disparately impact Latinos, 8 9 Justice Anthony
80. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).
8 1. Id. at 98 ("Nor may the prosecutor rebut the defendant's case merely by denying that
he had discriminatory motive or 'affirm[ing] [his] good faith in making individual
selections."' (alteration in original) (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632
(1972)).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 98 n.20 (quoting Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258
(1981) (a Title VII case)). Since adopting the three-part framework in Batson, the Court has
regularly relied on Title VII cases to shed light on the burden-shifting process. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 2410, 2418 n.7 (2005) (referring to Furnco Construction
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978), as an example of a Title VII case interpreting the
burden-shifting framework to be merely a sensible way to evaluate evidence); Purkett v.
Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (citing St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502
(1993), for the principle that "the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation
rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike"); Hernandez v. New York, 500
U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (relying on Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), for the proposition that proof of discriminatory intent is required
to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
84. 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (plurality opinion).
85. See Anthony Page, Batson's Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the
Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 155, 167 (2005) (commenting that in Hernandez,
"facial neutrality became paramount").
86. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360.
87. The prosecutor struck four Latino jurors in total, but Dionisio Hernandez did not
press his Batson claim with respect to two jurors whose brothers had been convicted of
crimes. Id. at 356.
88. Id. at 356-57. However, it is unclear that the prosecutor even knew whether the
jurors spoke Spanish or were Latino. See id at 356 (quoting the prosecutor saying, "Your
honor, my reason for rejecting the-these two jurors-I'm not certain as to whether they're
Hispanics").
89. Id. at 361-62.
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Kennedy, writing for a plurality, established that "[u]nless the government
actor adopted a criterion with the intent of causing the impact asserted, the
impact itself does not violate the principle of race neutrality." 90  The
question of race neutrality therefore turns on whether the prosecutor's
explanation for the strikes was discriminatory on its face and not whether
the strikes effect the elimination of jurors of a particular group. 91
The Court addressed the second step of Batson once again in a short per
curiam opinion in Purkett v. Elem.92 Purkett interpreted the requirement of
a "legitimate reason"93 to mean "not a reason that makes sense, but a reason
that does not deny equal protection." 94 Based on this interpretation, the
Court found acceptable the prosecutor's proffered explanation that he struck
two black jurors because they had facial hair and long hair, which made
them look suspicious. 95 The Court stated that the neutral explanation need
not be "persuasive, or even plausible" to satisfy the second step of Batson.96
Any reason, even a "silly or superstitious" reason, so long as it is not based
on race, is sufficient to shift the burden back to the defendant to prove that
those reasons are pretextual or false.97
After Hernandez and Purkett, the second step of Batson became only of
nominal function and significance. 98 Both decisions helped to usher Batson
challenges toward the final step of the Batson analysis: "the decisive
question" of "whether counsel's race-neutral explanations for a peremptory
challenge should be believed."99  The Hernandez Court gave some
guidance as to the final step, advising trial judges to base the credibility
determination on the striking attorney's demeanor, which is often the only
90. Id. at 362.
91. See Cavise, supra note 21, at 531 (commenting that the language of Hernandez
"clearly tells the trial judge to pay no attention to the content of the strike, unless blatantly
racist, and consider only whether the striking attorney was credible when the reason was
given"). Justice John Paul Stevens firmly disapproved of "focusing the entire inquiry on the
subjective state of mind of the prosecutor" at the third step of Batson. See Hernandez, 500
U.S. at 378 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He argued that "[bly requiring that the prosecutor's
explanation itself provide additional, direct evidence of discriminatory motive, the Court has
imposed on the defendant the added requirement that he generate evidence of the
prosecutor's actual subjective intent to discriminate." Id.
92. 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (per curiam) (holding that the race-neutral explanation
proffered by the proponent of a peremptory challenge need not be persuasive or even
plausible).
93. See supra text accompanying note 83 (quoting Batson for the proposition that the
prosecutor must state "legitimate reasons").
94. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 767-68.
97. Id. at 768.
98. See Page, supra note 85, at 169 ("Satisfying Batson's second step is trivial."). One
commentator remarked that Purkett "marked the definitive retrieval of the peremptory
challenge from the endangered species list and, with no more than a whimper, . . . marked
the final demise of the Batson doctrine into the rule of useless symbolism." Cavise, supra
note 21, at 528.
99. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991).
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evidence of the striking attorney's state of mind.'00 The Hernandez Court
also reminded appellate courts to review the trial judges' evaluations of
credibility, which are questions of fact, on a deferential standard.' 0'
3. Assessing Credibility Determinations at Step Three of Batson
In Miller-El v. Cockrell (Miller-El 1), 102 the Supreme Court elaborated on
the guidance provided in Hernandez for both trial courts and appellate
courts making credibility determinations at the third step of Batson. First,
the Court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's denial
of Thomas Joe Miller-El's application for a certificate for appealability
("COA"). 103 With this reversal, the Court signaled to federal courts that
"[e]ven in the context of federal habeas, deference does not imply
abandonment or abdication of judicial review." 104 Second, in establishing
that Miller-El had met the necessary threshold to be granted a COA, 105 the
Court analyzed the facts and circumstances of Miller-El's Batson claim,
identifying types of evidence, beyond demeanor, upon which to rely when
evaluating the striking party's credibility. 106 According to the Court, judges
should evaluate credibility based on the prosecutor's demeanor, how
reasonable or probable the explanation is, and whether the proffered
rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.' 07
Applying these principles to the case, the Court concluded that the denial
of Miller-El's constitutional right was indeed debatable by jurists of reason,
100. Id. According to one commentator, with these instructions, "the plurality intended to
direct the court to peer, as closely as possible, into the striking attorney's mind, to examine
his personal motivation in exercising the peremptory challenge." Robin Charlow, Tolerating
Deception and Discrimination After Batson, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 9, 35 (1997).
101. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364 ("In Batson, we explained that the trial court's decision
on the ultimate question of discriminatory intent represents a finding of fact of the sort
accorded great deference on appeal ...."). This standard virtually insulates peremptory
strikes from appellate review. See Ogletree, supra note 10, at 1107 (noting that "trial court
determinations... are largely unreviewable" due in part to "the long history of deference to
state court factual findings").
102. Miller-El v. Cockrell (Miller-El 1), 537 U.S. 322, 339 (2003), rev'd sub nom.,
Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317 (2005).
103. Id. at 348. If a district court denies a prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
the prisoner is not automatically entitled to appeal the district court's decision to the court of
appeals. Under AEDPA, no such appeal may be taken to a court of appeals unless the circuit
judge issues a certificate of appealability ("COA"), which may issue only if the applicant has
made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(l)-(2)
(2000).
104. Miller-ElI, 537 U.S. at 340.
105. Id. at 341 (stating that "we have no difficulty concluding that a COA should have
issued"). Under AEDPA, a prisoner seeking a COA must demonstrate "a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). In interpreting this
provision, the Supreme Court has held that a petitioner satisfies this standard by
demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his
constitutional claims or conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
106. Miller-El-I, 537 U.S. at 339.
107. Id.
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thereby meeting the standard for the issuance of a COA. 108 The Court
based this conclusion on five types of evidence or analysis: the statistical
evidence that the Dallas District Attorney used ten out of eleven peremptory
challenges to exclude nine out of fourteen African-Americans on the jury
venire; 109 the prosecutor's exclusion of black jurors for reasons that applied
to similarly situated white jurors who were not removed; 110 the prosecutor's
use of disparate questioning of black and white jurors during voir dire,
betraying an attempt to elicit disqualifying answers from black jurors; I the
prosecutor's practice of jury shuffling when a large number of black jurors
reached the front of the panel; 112 and evidence that the Dallas District
Attorney's office had a policy of racially discriminatory jury selection. 11 3
When, on remand, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Texas state court's
determination that the prosecutor's peremptory strikes were not
purposefully discriminatory, the Supreme Court again granted certiorari to
Miller-El, finding the decision as "unsupportable as the dismissive and
strained interpretation of his evidence" in the previous appeal."14 Reversing
the Fifth Circuit for a second time in Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El II), the
Supreme Court again signaled to appellate courts that they should be more
vigilant in reviewing trial court determinations of credibility." 5
The Court decided Miller-El II on the same day as Johnson in 2005. 1 16
These twin decisions marked an affirmative effort by the Court to salvage
the Batson framework from what the Court viewed as misapplication by the
lower courts. 117 The overarching message of the two decisions was that
whenever the trial judge can infer that a peremptory challenge was based on
a juror's group membership, a Batson challenge will ensue, and "'the
decisive question will be whether counsel's race-neutral explanation for a
108. Id. at 354. See supra note 105 for more information about the standard for COA
issuance.
109. See Miller-El i, 537 U.S. at 342.
110. See id at 342-43.
111. See id. at 344-45.
112. See id. at 346.
113. See id. at 346-47.
114. Miller-El I1, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2339 (2005) (internal quotations omitted).
115. See id. at 2325 ("The [clear and convincing] standard is demanding but not
insatiable; as we said the last time this case was here, '[d]eference does not by definition
preclude relief.' (quoting Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 340)); see also Charles Lane, Justices
Overturn Verdict, Cite Race: Blacks Were Unjustly Kept Off Texas Jury in '86 Death Row
Case, Wash. Post, June 14, 2005 (reporting that Miller-El's supporters believe the Court to
be "'saying Batson has to be taken very seriously and the lower federal courts can't just
defer to the conclusory findings of state courts' (quoting David Ogden, the lawyer who
represented Miller-El at the Supreme Court)).
116. Both cases were decided on June 13, 2005, although they were argued months apart.
117. See supra note 54 and accompanying text; see also Oral Argument, supra note 77, at
40 (a question from the bench suggesting that states following the same standard as
California would be "out of line"). Arguably, the questions that Batson left open to trial
courts "created opportunities for state and lower federal courts to interpret the commands of
Batson differently and, in some cases, to undermine the protection it offered." Ogletree,
supra note 52, at 349.
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peremptory challenge should be believed."' l 8  The next part of this
Comment will further explore the Court's reasoning behind this
interpretation of the Batson framework, as well as the related criticisms, and
contrast them with the reasoning behind the interpretation that the Johnson
Court rejected and the criticisms of that position.
II. THE EFFORT TO REMEDY BATSON IN JOHNSON V. CALIFORNIA AND THE
FORGONE ALTERNATIVE
In Johnson v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court differed from the
California Supreme Court on the question of whether the prima facie stage
requires the objecting party to bear a burden of persuasion. An examination
of each court's answer to this question reveals two ways of conceiving of
Batson's burden-shifting framework and how it should function. Each
interpretation has its merits and shortcomings. Part II.A will discuss the
Supreme Court's approach in Johnson, and Part II.B will discuss the
alternative approach of allowing state courts to raise the prima facie
threshold above the permissive inference of purposeful discrimination that
Johnson mandated.119
A. The Road Taken: The Supreme Court's Approach in Johnson v.
California
The Supreme Court's interpretation of Batson's first step as requiring a
low prima facie standard reflected the Court's view that Batson's burden-
shifting framework is a procedural device that provides "'a means of
arranging the presentation of evidence.""' 120 The first and second steps of
Batson merely "govern the production of evidence that allows the trial court
to determine the persuasiveness of the defendant's constitutional claim"12'
at step three. Only at this final stage, when the parties have presented all
the facts and circumstances, should the trial judge weigh the evidence. 122
By treating the burden-shifting framework as a formula for presenting
evidence, the Court purported to bring Batson in line with cases arising
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.123 In McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green,124 an employment discrimination case, the Court refined
the three-part framework for determining discriminatory intent in Title VII
cases. There, the Court indicated that the first step of the burden-shifting
scheme required the plaintiff to show that the defendant's actions were
118. See Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 339 (quoting Hemandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352,
365 (1991)).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 76-78.
120. Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 2410, 2418 & n.7 (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr.
v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510 & n.3 (1993)).
121. Id. at 2417-18.
122. Id. at 2417.
123. Id. at 2418 n.7 (noting that the majority's explanation "comports" with the
interpretation of the burden-shifting framework in the Title VII cases).
124. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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more likely than not, if unexplained, the product of discrimination.125 Then
in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, the Supreme Court reinterpreted the
first two steps to have only the practical function of shifting a burden of
production, rather than persuasion, from the plaintiff to defendant. 126 The
Court relied in part on Hicks to decide Johnson. 127
1. The Merits of a Low Prima Facie Standard
Several arguments can be made for treating the burden-shifting
framework as a procedural device. First, imposing no greater burden on the
objecting party than the production of some evidence of discriminatory
purpose allays concerns of unfairness to the objecting party. In Johnson,
the Court argued that imposing a burden of persuasion at the prima facie
stage would be unduly "onerous" because defendants would have to
persuade the judge based on facts that were "impossible for the defendant to
know with certainty."' 128 Those unknowable facts are the prosecutor's
stated reasons for excluding the jurors, which the trial judge should learn
before deciding whether the peremptory challenges were improperly
motivated. 129
Second, by facilitating the objecting party's progression to step two, the
Batson framework produces "actual answers to suspicions and inferences
that discrimination may have infected the jury selection process."' 30 The
Johnson Court's underlying assumption was that the prosecutor's facially
neutral explanation provides "a direct answer" to the "simple question"'13 1
125. See Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Walters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978) (stating that
McDonnell Douglas made clear that the plaintiff carried the initial burden of showing
actions "from which one can infer, if such actions remain unexplained, that it is more likely
than not that such actions were based on discriminatory criterion illegal under the Act"
(internal quotations omitted)).
126. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510 n.3 (1993) (stating that
despite McDonnell Douglas's language indicating otherwise, "as a practical matter ... in the
real-life sequence of a trial," it is "technically accurate" that the defendant bears the burden
to state a nondiscriminatory reason "not when the plaintiffs prima facie case is proved, but
as soon as evidence of it is introduced); see also Sheila R. Foster, Causation in
Antidiscrimination Law: Beyond Intent Versus Impact, 41 Hous. L. Rev. 1469, 1542 (2005)
(noting that in Hicks, the Court made a "dramatic move" by reducing the presumption from a
plaintiff's prima facie case to a procedural device "no different than a host of other
procedural rules that litter civil procedure"). But see Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S.
506, 509-15 (2002) (noting that the prima facie case should not be treated as a formula to be
pleaded).
127. See supra note 119.
128. Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 2417. In alleviating this "onerous" burden on the defendant,
the Johnson Court mimicked the Batson Court's reaction to the "crippling" burden under
Swain: remove obstacles that tend to immunize peremptory strikes from constitutional
scrutiny. See supra Part I.C. 1.
129. Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 2417. The attorney for the petitioner Johnson emphasized this
point in oral arguments. See Oral Argument, supra note 77, at 23 (arguing that "the
information we're trying to find.., goes to the guts of the question of racial discrimination"
which cannot "be determined unless we know the prosecutor's reason").
130. Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 2418.
131. Id.
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of whether or not purposeful discrimination motivated the prosecutor's use
of peremptory strikes. Obtaining the prosecutor's direct answers prior to
deciding the Batson issue may be preferable to the "needless and imperfect
speculation" in which the trial judge would engage if required to weigh the
evidence at the prima facie stage. 132
Third, by entitling the objecting party to hear the striking party's reasons,
"[t]he three-step process... serves the public purposes that Batson is
designed to vindicate." 133 The Johnson Court's overriding concern was the
harm that discriminatory jury selection inflicts on the entire community:
status-based exclusion of persons from jury service, an important institution
of democratic society and representative government, 134 undermines
"public confidence" in the judicial system. 135  The Court's reasoning
implied that a low prima facie standard, which allows challenges to proceed
through all three steps, facilitates access to jury service or, at least, an
appearance of fairness in our system of justice. 136 Even if the objecting
party does not succeed in the Batson challenge, the prima facie case
recognizes the allegation of racial discrimination and the claim of equal
protection by allowing the excluded juror to have her "day in court. ' 137
Dismissing suspicions of discriminatory purpose at the first stage of Batson,
without asking the striking party to provide its reasons, would be to deny
access not only to jury service, but to "the heart of the equal protection
analysis."' 38
2. The Criticisms of a Low Prima Facie Standard
The virtues of the Johnson Court's decision, however, can also be
construed as shortcomings. First, reducing the role of the prima facie
inquiry to a procedural device 139 destroys the powerful normative
assumptions underlying the presumption of purposeful discrimination that
132. Id. According to Johnson's lawyer, the State Attorney General's office "speculated
as to five possible reasons for the challenges" to one juror and "eight possible reasons for the
challenges" to another juror, indicating that the prosecutor's real reasons cannot be
determined through speculation. Oral Argument, supra note 77, at 23.
133. Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 2418.
134. See Underwood, supra note 38, at 726-27 (noting the importance of jury service as a
democratic institution).
135. See id.; cf King, supra note 4, at 766 (noting that in the context of venire selection,
"the very legitimacy of our jury system is at stake" when "juries fail to reflect the racial
diversity of the communities from which they are drawn").
136. See King, supra note 4, at 766. In Swain v. Alabama, the Court remarked that "to
perform its high function in the best way, 'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."'
380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
137. Cf Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (noting, in the context of collateral
attacks, our "'deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court"'
(quoting 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4449, at
417 (1981))). This notion is bound up in our understanding of procedural due process.
138. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 367 (1991).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 120-22.
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forms at the prima facie stage.140 A merely procedural prima facie inquiry
allows the trial court to be uncritical about the ways in which peremptory
strikes "permit[] 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to
discriminate""' 14 1 and removes the sting of the presumption of racist jury
selection practices that the prima facie case creates.
Second, by emphasizing the importance of discovering the "direct
answers" of the striking party, the Johnson Court forced trial judges to
focus on the weakest evidence produced in the three-part framework. 142
The striking party's proffered reasons are not necessarily probative of its
actual reasons for excluding the prospective jurors, as the Court assumed. 143
As a result, the Johnson decision is subject to the same criticisms that
Batson has endured since its inception, and particularly after Hernandez v.
New York and Purkett v. Elem.144
For years, commentators have remarked that Batson's "Achilles heel" is
its focus on proof of the discriminatory state of mind of the striking
party.' 45 Proof of intent to discriminate is particularly elusive because, as
Justice Marshall warned, racism may be conscious 146 or unconscious in the
140. Cf Foster, supra note 126, at 1542 (arguing in the employment discrimination
context that "the reduction of the presumption of status influence from the plaintiffs prima
facie case showing to a mere 'procedural device, designed only to establish [the] order of
proof and production,"' strips the presumption of its underlying normative assumptions
about the existence and persistence of status discrimination in the labor market (quoting St.
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 521 (1993))). The Title VII case to which
Professor Sheila R. Foster refers is the case that the Supreme Court quotes in Johnson for the
same proposition. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
141. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345
U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
142. Miller-El II, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005) ("Batson's individualized focus came with
a weakness of its own owing to its very emphasis on the particular reasons a prosecutor
might give.").
143. Because the prosecutor's stated reasons may not be probative of the actual reasons
for the peremptory strikes, defendants have urged appellate courts to recognize a right to
cross-examine prosecutors at Batson hearings. See, e.g., Majid v. Portuondo, 428 F.3d 112,
128 (2d Cir. 2005) (recognizing "'the value of cross-examination in exposing falsehood'
(quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965)), but concluding that the lack of
opportunity for cross-examination, alone, did not render an otherwise full and fair hearing in
trial court inadequate). For a discussion of other cases that have addressed the role of cross-
examination in Batson hearings, see id. at 127-28. Some trial courts have experimented with
ex parte examinations of prosecutors' voir dire notes and have generally been upheld on
appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Garrison, 849 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir. 1988).
144. See, e.g., Cavise, supra note 21, at 538 (noting that one Illinois court has called the
post-Purkett neutral explanation a "charade" and surmised that .' [s]urely, new prosecutors
are given a manual, probably entitled, Handy Race-Neutral Explanations or 20 Time-Tested
Race-Neutral Explanations"' (quoting People v. Randall, 671 N.E.2d 60, 65-66 (I11. App. Ct.
1996)).
145. See, e.g., Brand, supra note 14, at 599; Brian Wilson, Batson v. Kentucky: Can the
'New' Peremptory Challenge Survive the Resurrection of Strauder v. West Virginia?, 20
Akron L. Rev. 355, 364 (1986) ("[S]ince Batson places much emphasis on a trial judge's
ability to identify prosecutorial intent to discriminate, Batson lacks the necessary 'teeth'
required to ensure that black jurors are not excluded on the basis of race.").
146. Conscious racism was more of a concern in the years following Batson. See, e.g.,
Serr & Maney, supra note 22, at 47 (noting that considering the "lengthy list of valid
3353
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
minds of striking parties and judges presiding over voir dire. 147 Professor
Leonard L. Cavise has observed that "[a] large variety of explanations can
be surrogates for race, gender, or ethnicity."'148 Courts have accepted
explanations that directly correlate with race, such as living in the same
neighborhood as the defendant or in a high-crime area, 149 even though "it
does not follow that the juror and the striking party have similar
perspectives and that therefore the juror cannot be fair and impartial.' 150
By relying on the credibility determination to do the work of ferreting out
discrimination, Johnson also invites the long-standing criticism that trial
judges are "ill equipped to second-guess" the striking party's facially
neutral reasons. 151 The Supreme Court has conceded that "[t]here will
seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best evidence often
will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge." 152
Studies have shown, however, that judging credibility based on demeanor is
susceptible to great inaccuracy. 153 Furthermore, considering the prevalence
prosecutorial justifications, it is apparent that any thoughtful prosecutor can sufficiently
disguise racial discrimination with racially-neutral reasons"). Today, unconscious
stereotyping is more of a concern. See generally Page, supra note 85, at 161 (proposing steps
to reduce discriminatory use of peremptory strikes in light of the psychological fact that
"much bias is automatic, unconscious, and unintentional").
147. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("A
prosecutor's own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him easily to the conclusion
that a prospective black juror is 'sullen,' or 'distant,' a characterization that would not have
come to his mind if a white juror had acted identically."); see also Brand, supra note 14, at
613 (agreeing that "'requiring proof of conscious or intentional motivation as a prerequisite
to constitutional recognition that a decision is race-dependent ignores much of what we
understand about how the human mind works"' (quoting Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id,
the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317,
323 (1987)).
148. Cavise, supra note 21, at 532.
149. See id. (citing cases that have upheld such explanations and further noting that
"[o]ne prosecutor successfully excused several African-American jurors with the explanation
that they were affiliated with Alabama State University, 'a predominantly black
institution'). But see United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 825 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding the
prosecutor's explanation that he struck an African-American juror not because of her race
but rather because "she lived in Compton, a poor and violent community whose residents are
likely to be 'anesthetized to such violence,"' to be pretextual because it "both reflected and
conveyed deeply ingrained and pernicious stereotypes").
150. Cavise, supra note 21, at 532.
151. Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring); see also Theodore McMillian &
Christopher J. Petrini, Batson v. Kentucky: A Promise Unfulfilled, 58 UMKC L. Rev. 361,
369 (1990) ("Ineffective scrutiny of prosecution explanations is the single greatest problem
hindering the effective implementation of Batson."); Ogletree, supra note 10, at 1110
("Batson's greatest flaw is its implicit assumption that courts are capable of detecting race-
based challenges to Afro-American jurors.").
152. Hemandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991).
153. See Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 1075, 1075 (1991)
(arguing that, contrary to the legal premise that triers of fact will make significantly more
accurate judgments of credibility if given the opportunity to observe demeanor, some
empirical evidence indicates "that the observation of demeanor diminishes rather than
enhances the accuracy of credibility judgments").
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of unconscious racism, 154 a striking party could presumably give false
reasons with an earnest demeanor.
A somewhat more effective tool is comparing excluded jurors with
similarly situated jurors that were not excluded to discern disparate
treatment. 155 This type of analysis can be complicated when some but not
all of the struck jurors are similarly situated to accepted jurors, or when the
overall number of minorities in the jury pool is low. 156 Also, comparative
juror analysis is not always available, particularly because trial judges often
curtail voir dire questioning.157
Even with the proper tools, however, trial judges may have little
incentive to identify purposeful discrimination because, at the credibility
determination stage, the trial judge is often in the awkward position of
questioning whether a prosecutor, who comes before the judge on a regular
basis, is lying to the court. 158 Judges will tend to find stated reasons
acceptable to avoid the uncomfortable position of "implicitly call[ing] an
officer of the court a liar by ruling to reject his reason. 1 59
Considering these many criticisms, did Johnson perhaps foreclose an
alternative remedy that would have enabled courts to regulate peremptory
strikes more effectively? The next section will discuss the reasoning for
permitting state courts to raise the prima facie standard above a permissive
inference.
B. The Road Forsaken: Allowing Trial Courts to Raise the Prima Facie
Standard
Whereas the Johnson Court interpreted the first step of Batson to require
evidence that would permit a judge to infer that the striking party's
challenges were status based, the California Supreme Court interpreted the
first step to require evidence that the striking party's peremptory challenges
were more likely than not, if unexplained, based on impermissible group
bias. 160 This standard demands a higher quantum of proof, "a strong mass
of evidence" that has persuasive value. 161 This interpretation of Batson's
first step reflects the California Supreme Court's view that the prima facie
154. See supra note 146 (discussing unconscious racism).
155. The Supreme Court modeled this type of analysis in Miller-El I, 537 U.S. 322, 342-
43 (2003), rev'dsub nom., Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317 (2005).
156. See Cavise, supra note 21, at 543.
157. See Deborah L. Forman, Wat Difference Does It Make? Gender and Jury
Selection, 2 UCLA Women's L.J. 35, 71 (1992); cf Ogletree, supra note 10, at 1125-26
(commenting that the "restrictive nature of voir dire" is one reason that peremptory
challenges have been used to exclude certain groups that the striking party feels will be
unfavorable).
158. See Jos6 Felipd Anderson, Catch Me If You Can! Resolving the Ethical Tragedies in
the Brave New World of Jury Selection, 32 New Eng. L. Rev. 343, 376 (1998).
159. Id.
160. People v. Johnson, 71 P.3d 270, 272 (Cal. 2003).
161. See Oral Argument, supra note 77, at 39, 43 (the attorney for California arguing that
Wigmore's concept of "strong mass of evidence" should be applied at the first step of Batson
challenges) (referring to 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2494 (3d ed. 1940)).
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case creates a "legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" of purposeful
discrimination,] 62 rather than the permissive inference created by the first
step of the Johnson Court's framework.
1. The Merits of a Higher Prima Facie Standard
Several arguments support the "more likely than not" standard. First, by
successfully establishing a prima facie case, the objecting party would be
entitled to prevail unless the striking party rebutted the facts or explained
the reasons for its peremptory challenges.' 63 Clearly defining the quantum
of proof that the objecting party must show to prevail serves both the
striking party and the objecting party in two ways: one, it informs the
parties as to their likelihood of success on a challenge and thus encourages
more selectivity in bringing challenges, 164 and two, it constrains the
decision making of judges in their capacity as fact finders, resulting in less
arbitrary determinations. 165
Second, because it creates an actual presumption of discrimination, rather
than simply a permissive inference, the higher prima facie standard is likely
to place greater pressure on the striking party to produce more probative
evidence of its reasons for excluding the jurors in question. 166 A stronger
presumption would likely serve a prophylactic function as well, deterring
the use of peremptory strikes to remove minority jurors in cases where no
other valid reason exists or where no reason is sufficient to rebut the
presumption. 167
162. Johnson, 71 P.3d at 278 ("[W]hen it refers to the objector establishing 'an inference
of discriminatory purpose,' the high court means establishing a legally mandatory rebuttable
presumption, and not merely presenting enough evidence to permit the inference" (citations
omitted)).
163. See Oral Argument, supra note 77, at 39; cf Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Recapturing
Summary Adjudication Principles in Disparate Treatment Cases, 58 SMU L. Rev. 103, 134
(2005) (noting in the context of Title VII cases that although "the Supreme Court may no
longer agree, by definition, a prima facie case supports an inference of discrimination and, if
the facts underlying it have not been disproved, is sufficient to support a verdict for
plaintiff').
164. Under a lower prima facie standard, criminal defense lawyers have proven to be
"relatively unselective about raising Batson challenges." Melilli, supra note 23, at 461; see
also Oral Argument, supra note 77, at 45 (the attorney for California arguing that a "low
standard will create an incentive to bring these motions more frequently").
165. Cf Chambers, supra note 163, at 115 (noting that in the Title VII context, the
McDonnell Douglas test "specifically provided guidance to judges in their capacity as
factfinders"); Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93
Mich. L. Rev. 2229, 2237 (1995) (stating that if after Hicks, the McDonnell Douglas test can
do "nothing the normal rules of civil procedure cannot do, [and] it neither aids nor constrains
judicial decisionmaking, [then] one must ask whether it makes sense to continue to use the
[McDonnell Douglas] proof structure at all"). See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying
text for an explanation of the McDonnell Douglas and Hicks cases.
166. See Oral Argument, supra note 77, at 38 (the bench noting that if the prima facie
case is successful, the prosecutor is "in a rather difficult spot ... [b]ecause the prosecutor
has already been told you lose unless you've got a darned good reason").
167. See id. at 38-39.
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Third, this version of the burden-shifting framework privileges evidence
of a more reliable nature than the striking party's stated reasons. 168 The
facts and circumstances supporting a Batson challenge are not susceptible
to the same perils of fabrication and unconscious pretext as are facially
neutral reasons. 169  Once a prima facie case is established by the
preponderance of the evidence, the probative value of the proffered
explanation is only comparative, measured against the strength of the
evidence supporting the presumption of discrimination.
A fourth advantage of focusing on the facts of the prima facie case is that
trial judges are arguably more capable of determining the sufficiency of a
prima facie showing than the credibility of facially neutral reasons for
peremptory strikes. 170 According to the California Supreme Court, trial
judges are "in a good position to make [prima facie] determinations" due to
"their knowledge of local conditions and of local prosecutors," "their
powers of observation, their understanding of trial techniques, and their
broad judicial experience."' 7 1 Furthermore, trial judges exercise this type
of judgment regularly in the course of litigation, for example, when
determining preliminary questions regarding the admissibility of
evidence. 172
2. The Criticisms of a Higher Prima Facie Standard
A higher prima facie standard does not solve all of Batson's problems,
nor does it escape criticism. First, according to the dissent in People v.
Johnson, imposing a burden of persuasion on the objecting party at the first
step of Batson "short-circuits the process, and provides inadequate
protection" of the jeopardized rights. 173 In fact, the higher prima facie
standard prioritizes the peremptory nature of peremptory challenges over
168. See supra note 142 and accompanying text for remarks on the unreliability of the
striking party's proffered reasons.
169. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text for remarks on the susceptibility of
stated reasons to fabrication and pretext. In Miller-El 11, the Court even noted that when the
falsity of stated reasons had not "shown up within the four comers of a given case," the trial
court may need to rely on the relevant circumstances that gave rise to an inference of
purposeful discrimination. 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005).
170. Cf Chambers, supra note 163, at 134 ("[F]ocusing on the prima facie case rather
than proof of falsity and pretext . . . better addresses the core concern that justifies the
McDonnell Douglas test-fear of improper judicial fact-finding ....").
171. People v. Johnson, 71 P.3d 270, 274 (Cal. 2003) (internal quotation omitted).
172. The California Supreme Court's prima facie determination is a mixed question of
law and fact because it involves the application of a legal standard to facts. Some mixed
questions of law and fact are determined by the trial court. See United States v. Gaudin, 515
U.S. 506, 525-26 (1995) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (noting examples of mixed questions
of law and fact that remain in the trial court's domain, including preliminary questions in a
trial regarding the admissibility of evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a), the
competency of witnesses, the voluntariness of confessions, and the legality of searches and
seizures).
173. Johnson, 71 P.3d at 291 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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the equal protection rights of the defendant and excluded juror.174 This
compromise weighs against constitutionally protected rights and in favor of
the inferior statutory right of parties to challenge peremptorily. 175
A second criticism is that a higher prima facie standard tolerates a higher
quantum of discrimination. 176 The "more likely than not" standard would
insulate the peremptory challenges that raise a suspicion or inference of
discrimination but fall short of showing that the peremptory challenges
were more likely than not status based. 177 This insulation invites two
criticisms: First, the risk of the case being tried by a jury chosen with racial
discrimination should outweigh the cost of inefficiency to the system; 178
and second, by tolerating a greater degree of discrimination, the higher
prima facie standard detracts from Batson's expressive function of
demonstrating that the law prevents stigmatization of excluded groups as
inferior or less worthy of participation in the system of justice. 179
Finally, as the Johnson Court concluded, the "more likely than not"
prima facie standard requires trial judges to engage in "needless and
imperfect speculation."' 180  Upon the objecting party's introduction of
evidence to establish a prima facie case, the judge would have to consider
the likelihood that, in the absence of an intent to discriminate, the striking
party would have a reason nonetheless to exclude the juror.181 Considering
174. See Oral Argument, supra note 77, at 45 (the attorney for California defending "the
nature of privilege of peremptory challenges," and equating it with "the nature of any other
privilege that protects information").
175. Miller-El II, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2344 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (agreeing with
Justice Goldberg's dissenting opinion in Swain, which states, "'Were it necessary to make an
absolute choice between the fight of a defendant to have a jury chosen in conformity with the
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and the right to challenge peremptorily, the
Constitution compels a choice of the former' (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202
(1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting))).
176. The toleration of any quantum of discrimination has been criticized since Batson's
inception. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 105 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(identifying among the Batson framework's limitations the fact that "[pirosecutors are left
free to discriminate against blacks in jury selection provided that they hold that
discrimination to an 'acceptable' level").
177. This approach strongly contrasts with the approach that Johnson's lawyer advocated
in Johnson of finding a prima facie case "when in doubt." See Oral Argument, supra note
77, at 11.
178. See id. at 10.
179. An expressive theory of law claims that the law and legal official actions are
"symbolic" and "send a message" and should be evaluated in those terms. See Matthew D.
Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1363, 1364
(2000). Many scholars of equal protection emphasize the expressive rationale of the
antidiscrimination principle. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-
Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1976);
Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2410 (1994). But see Adler,
supra (arguing that expressive theories are not persuasive).
180. Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 2410, 2418 (2005).
181. According to social scientists, this type of reasoning process is called "counterfactual
reasoning." See Foster, supra note 126, at 1475. Professor Foster argues that counterfactual
reasoning suffers from the erosion of normative assumptions about the existence, prevalence,
and operation of discrimination on which the counterfactual exercise is based. Id. at 1534-47.
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that there may be more than one plausible reason for striking a juror,182 the
trial court's speculation is too imperfect a ground on which to reject the
objecting party's Batson challenge.
This part identified the merits and dangers of a low prima facie standard
and contrasted them with the merits and dangers of a high prima facie
standard. The next part will argue that, ultimately, the higher prima facie
standard would improve Batson's efficacy in regulating peremptory strikes.
III. IN DEFENSE OF GATEKEEPING: THE SYSTEMIC BENEFITS OF A HIGHER
PRIMA FACIE STANDARD FOR BA TSON CLAIMS
To quarrel with the Johnson Court's decision on this "narrow but
important' 83 issue would seem, at first blush, unthinkable for anyone
concerned with Batson's project of equal protection. 184 Under California's
"more likely than not" standard, many decent Batson challenges might fail
at the prima facie stage. 185 Considering the persistence of discriminatory
practices in jury selection, 186 what would justify raising hurdles for the
objecting party at the first stage of the Batson analysis?
A closer examination of Johnson, however, suggests that the Supreme
Court may have moved in exactly the wrong direction. With its ruling in
Johnson, the Court pushed Batson and peremptory strikes farther down the
road to extinction. Had the Court ruled exactly opposite, instead allowing
state courts to establish a more rigorous prima facie standard for Batson
challenges, the ailing Batson framework might have had a chance to
survive.
Certainly, a higher prima facie standard, alone, would not have been the
panacea for all of Batson's ills, but it would have been a step toward more
meaningful and effective regulation of peremptory strikes. This part argues
that a higher prima facie standard would have significant systemic benefits
and would positively influence litigants' jury selection behavior. The
question of whether Batson and peremptory strikes, even with these
improvements, would be worth salvaging is left open. 187
The primary benefit of a higher prima facie standard is a better separation
of Batson claims.188 Our judicial system values the separation of claims for
182. See supra note 132.
183. Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 2416.
184. This position is at least unconventional. In the context of Title VII, one
commentator arguing for more rigorous assessment of claims at the prima facie stage noted
that "[u]ndoubtedly, focusing on the prima facie case rather than proof of falsity and pretext
is unconventional." Chambers, supra note 163, at 134.
185. See supra text accompanying note 177.
186. See supra notes 1, 9 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (providing citations to those who
support and oppose the abolition of peremptory strikes).
188. The California Supreme Court described the prima facie burden as having this
sorting function. See People v. Johnson, 71 P.3d 270, 279 (Cal. 2003) (stating that the prima
facie burden "is one 'which a party may reasonably be expected to sustain in meritorious
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both its efficiency and truth-seeking benefits and entrusts this gatekeeping
role to civil judges, who make rulings on motions to dismiss, and
prosecutors, who have broad charging discretion and investigatory powers.
A higher prima facie standard would regulate the flow of Batson challenges
similarly to the way a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment
regulates the flow of civil lawsuits, including equal protection cases in other
settings. These mechanisms are designed to filter out claims that are
factually insufficient or too insubstantial to warrant the use of judicial
resources. 189
Gatekeeping is particularly important in the jury selection context
because Batson hearings normally occur within an ongoing criminal
prosecution, where the judge, as well as the parties, has a strong interest in
avoiding unnecessary mini-hearings. 190 Moreover, the danger that a trial
judge would dismiss a meritorious Batson claim at the prima facie stage is
no greater than the danger of a judge denying a remedy to a deserving claim
at the third stage of Batson. Both decisions are equally exposed to appellate
review. 191
When seeking appellate review, a Batson challenger who failed to meet a
higher prima facie standard may have the advantage of a better voir dire
record than a challenger who lost at the credibility determination stage of
the current Batson framework. As a motion for summary judgment would
incentivize parties to conduct diligent discovery to support their claims, so
too would the imposition of a higher prima facie standard incentivize the
Batson challenger to be a vigilant investigator during voir dire, gathering
and recording as many facts as possible to create a presumption of
discrimination. 192 Whether the challenge fails at the prima facie stage or
cases, but which he cannot abuse to the detriment of the peremptory challenge system.'
(quoting People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 763 (Cal. 1978)).
189. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (stressing the value of
summary judgment in sorting out meritless claims in light of the shift to notice pleading
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). But see Jack H. Friedenthal & Joshua E.
Gardner, Judicial Discretion to Deny Summary Judgment in the Era of Managerial Judging,
31 Hofstra L. Rev. 91, 117 (2002) (noting the danger that summary judgment can be used as
a docket control measure). One commentator has noted that, with the increasing number of
cases brought under the Civil Rights Act, federal courts have sought to weed out
insubstantial claims by declaring conclusory allegations inadequate to state a civil rights
claim. Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 433, 449 (1986). In particular, the Third Circuit has noted
that " [ilt is an important public policy to weed out the frivolous and insubstantial cases at an
early stage in the litigation."' Id. (quoting Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 922
(3d Cir. 1976)).
190. Batson "minihearings" abound in trial courts. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 147
(1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Batson minihearings are now routine in state and federal
trial courts."); Cavise, supra note 21, at 541 (remarking that the "proliferation of
'minihearings' is perhaps the most obvious of the Batson after-shocks").
191. A trial judge's error at any stage in a Batson ruling constitutes a structural defect and
grounds for reversal.
192. Commentators have urged the need for "[e]xpansive attomey-conducted voir dire...
as a necessary step towards empaneling a fair jury and reducing the role of stereotypes and
biases in the jury selection process." Ogletree, supra note 10, at 1100. But see Norbert L.
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the credibility determination stage, the augmented record will serve both the
appellate lawyer arguing the trial judge's error and the appellate judge
reviewing the ruling. 193
In contrast, a low prima facie standard provides no incentive to the
objecting party to be scrupulous in building the voir dire record. Objectors
successfully argue prima facie cases with minimal presentation of facts. In
this sense, a low prima facie standard fails to function optimally as a trigger
for the production of evidence. 194 Circuit courts rejecting the imposition of
additional evidentiary requirements, 195 such as statistical accounting of the
race of prospective jurors in the venire, have suggested that specific
requirements would impose an "undue burden upon the defendant[s]" at the
prima facie stage. 196 To the contrary, the burden is appropriately imposed
and ultimately places the defendant at an advantage. Appeals of Batson
rulings are much stronger when the record meticulously reflects the
circumstances of the peremptory strikes and provides facts on which the
appellate attorney can draw for comparative juror analyses and other
arguments. 197
Since the facts supporting a Batson challenge are readily apparent to the
trial judge but not to the appellate judge, the appellate court is more likely
to defer to the trial court's "no prima facie case" finding when the
defendant fails to put relevant facts in the record. 198 The paucity of a voir
dire record may force appellate judges to defer to rulings at the credibility
determination stage of Batson as well. As the Supreme Court noted in
Miller-El 11, when the falsity of stated reasons is not "shown up within the
Kerr et al., On the Effectiveness of Voir Dire in Criminal Cases with Prejudicial Pretrial
Publicity: An Empirical Study, 40 Am. U. L. Rev. 665, 699 (1991) (noting that voir dire by
its nature has a limited power to describe the potential biases of a particular juror). Other
drawbacks to voir dire questioning about bias have been duly noted. See, e.g., Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 129 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that Batson would
imprint "racial differentiation" on voir dire, because the parties would develop evidence to
support their claims by asking jurors to state their race and national origin, even if those
questions were personally offensive to the jurors); Jere W. Morehead, When a Peremptory
Challenge Is No Longer Peremptory: Batson's Unfortunate Failure to Eradicate Invidious
Discrimination from Jury Selection, 43 DePaul L. Rev. 625, 636-37 (1994) (describing the
voir dire required by Batson as too time-consuming and expensive).
193. Commentators have urged defendants to "make a record of the 'numbers' relevant to
raising an inference of intentional discrimination" and noted that "appellate courts are
requiring the record to contain information regarding the number of defendant's minority
group on the venire and the number serving on the actual jury." Serr & Maney, supra note
22, at 38.
194. For a discussion of the prima facie inquiry operating as a means to arrange the
production of evidence, see supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
195. See Williams v. Woodford, 396 F.3d 1059, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2005) (Rawlinson, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (rejecting the requirement of statistical
evidence because, while informative, it is not mandatory); Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707
(3d Cir. 2004) (rejecting Pennsylvania's additional evidentiary requirements at the prima
facie stage).
196. Holloway, 355 F.3d at 728.
197. An incomplete record is one of the greatest challenges facing appellate defense
attorneys challenging errors in Batson rulings.
198. Serr & Maney, supra note 22, at 38.
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four corners of a given case," the court will need to rely on the relevant
circumstances that gave rise to an inference of purposeful discrimination. 199
A solid record of these circumstances is indispensable to meaningful
appellate review.
Another corollary of a higher prima facie standard is a more adversarial
Batson proceeding. Because the objecting party bears a persuasive burden
at the prima facie stage, the attorney would not only be more rigorous in
discovering facts to support the Batson challenge, but also in advocating for
a presumption of discrimination. An adversarial presentation of evidence at
the prima facie stage would force the striking party to defend its strikes with
better evidence of neutrality. The adversarial pressure and the force of the
presumption of racial discrimination may even compel the striking party to
state the reasons for the strikes more candidly. 200  As an adversarial
proceeding rather than a procedural device for presenting evidence, Batson
hearings may be better structured for truth seeking.
The higher prima facie standard would positively influence litigants'
behavior in a prophylactic way as well. One study highlights the
disproportionate failure of criminal defendants to prevail on Batson
challenges compared with other litigants under the current framework and
postulates that "criminal defense lawyers are relatively unselective about
raising Batson challenges."'20 1 Facing a higher prima facie hurdle, striking
parties would be forced to think more carefully about the strength of the
case and decide whether or not to bring the challenge. This self-regulation
may serve a gatekeeping function in addition to the trial judge's sorting of
strong and weak claims. It is likely that by being more selective, striking
parties would see an increase in the success rate of Batson challenges.
One criticism of a demanding prima facie standard is that a quantum of
discrimination will be tolerated.20 2 Invariably, some discriminatory uses of
peremptory strikes will go undetected below the radar of the prima facie
threshold. But objecting parties that fail to raise a presumption of
discrimination are unlikely to prevail ultimately, and "[t]hus, most of this
'insulated' discrimination is nonremediable." 20 3 Moreover, Batson itself
accounted for this modicum of unregulated discrimination, allowing some
deference to the parties' prerogatives to exercise peremptory strikes.204
Allowing courts to impose a higher prima facie threshold certainly
embodies different priorities than the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson.
While Johnson prioritized the "public confidence" in our judicial system
and the appearance of fairness, 20 5 the sorting approach prioritizes the
efficacy of the Batson framework and the regulation of litigants' jury
199. Miller-El I, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005).
200. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
201. Melilli, supra note 23, at 461.
202. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
203. Serr & Maney, supra note 22, at 42.
204. Id. at 43.
205. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
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selection practices. Ultimately, the sorting approach seems to have the
priorities in order. Only if peremptory strikes are more effectively
regulated will the jury selection process ever appear fair in the eyes of the
community.
Notes & Observations
